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 Introduction 
Domestic subsidies to agriculture were brought under the discipline of global trade rules for the 
first time in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 1994. Member countries of the WTO decided to reduce the distortions 
that were caused by current levels of domestic farm subsidies. Under the URAA, domestic 
support is classified into three categories or “boxes” according to their impact on international 
trade. The amber-box contains the most distorting subsidies, which are therefore required to be 
limited in use. The blue-box payments also cause some distortion but are required to be 
production limiting. The green-box contains subsidies that cause no or minimal distortion. The 
subsidies in the blue- and green-boxes are excluded from all WTO disciplines. To reduce trade 
distortions caused by these farm subsidies, members were required to shift towards decoupled 
income support while reducing coupled support. Decoupled support policies are categorized as 
green-box payments. They are defined as payments that are financed by taxpayers and are not 
related to current production, factor use, or prices, and for which eligibility criteria are defined 
by a fixed, historical base period. Since they are exempt from WTO disciplines, decoupled 
payments have become an important part of income support that is provided to agriculture, 
especially in industrialized countries. 
Developing countries and natural exporters of agricultural goods have “resisted” the 
established leadership of the EU and United States in WTO negotiations. New coalitions such as 
the Cairns group and the various Gs groups are questioning farm subsidies in many industrialized 
countries.
1 All subsidies will eventually be scrutinized. Beyond amber- and blue-box payments, 
                                                           
1  The Group of 20 or G20, with variations of G21, G22, and G20+,  are  a coalition of developing economies 
established in 2003 just before the 5th Ministerial WTO conference, held in Cancún, Mexico. The Group seeks to 
break the US-EU dominance on WTO negotiations. It currently includes: in Africa: Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe; in Asia: China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand; an in Latin America: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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the table. The 2003 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms with its new decoupled Single 
Farm Payment (SFP) and the United States attempts to boost green-box payments to offset 
expected reductions in amber- and blue-box support are viewed suspiciously by many 
developing countries as a more hidden way to foster agricultural production and trade.  
Green-box payments are likely to be central to the round following the Doha round. This 
evolution of the WTO agricultural negotiations is happening in the context of recent WTO 
rulings against Canadian dairy, EU sugar and U.S. cotton policies, all three shown to be 
distorting and inconsistent with WTO obligations. The U.S. cotton dispute also put the U.S. 
direct payments inclusion in the green-box into question although the latter were not initially a 
focus of the dispute. Many countries with large farm programs are pushing their own interest 
groups to consider less coupled policies or decoupled policies fitting under generously-defined 
blue- and green-boxes under a new WTO agreement at the conclusion of the Doha round. The 
policy debate has led to various claims and conjectures to explain the link between decoupled 
payments and production decisions and market outcomes (Aksoy and Beghin (2004)). The 
economics profession has recently addressed and delineated many of these potential links, both 
with analytical conceptualizations and empirical investigations. This large body of work 
accumulated in the last ten years motivates taking stock and evaluating what has been settled and 
what is left to elucidate. 
This survey paper distills the recent literature on decoupling of farm programs in the last 10 
years, building on a previous survey by Abler and Blandford (2005). It first describes the 
ambiguity surrounding “decoupling” and then assesses the various channels of potential coupling 
of decoupled farm payments and provides a taxonomy of coupling mechanisms found in 
theoretical and empirical papers. The majority of the papers reviewed find that decoupled 
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magnitude. The paper identifies unresolved issues on “coupling mechanisms” for further 
research. The following programs have been considered in this paper: the production flexibility 
contract (PFC) payments from the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) 
Act which have been continued as direct payments in the 2002 Farm Security and Rural 
Investment (FSRI) Act and the counter-cyclical payments (CCP) in the United States, and the 
CAP area payments in the EU. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides two 
important definitions of decoupled payments and identifies the coupling mechanisms of 
decoupled payments. Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 review the recent literature, classifying papers 
by the specific mechanism. Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. Definition of Decoupled Payments and Coupling Mechanisms 
Two prominent definitions of “decoupled” payments are based on the URAA (as defined in 
Annex 2.6) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The 
URAA defines decoupling in terms of policy design as taxpayer financed payments satisfying 
the following criteria: (i) Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by clearly defined 
criteria such as income, status as a producer or landowner, factor use or production level in a 
defined and fixed base period. (ii) The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be 
related to, or based on, the type or volume of production (including livestock units) undertaken 
by the producer in any year after the base period. (iii) The amount of such payments in any given 
year shall not be related to, or based on, the prices, domestic or international, applying to any 
production undertaken in any year after the base period. (iv) The amount of such payments in 
any given year shall not be related to, or based on, the factors of production employed in any 
year after the base period. (v) No production shall be required in order to receive such payments. 
  3The OECD defines decoupling in terms of policy effects (Cahill (1997)). A policy is “fully 
decoupled” if “it does not influence production decisions of farmers receiving payments.” 
Beyond unchanged market equilibrium, market adjustment to any exogenous shocks should not 
be affected either. Both the shape and the position of supply and demand curves are unchanged. 
A less restrictive concept, “effectively fully decoupled,” means that equilibrium levels of 
production and trade are unchanged but the shape of the demand and supply curves can change.  
While some payments may narrowly satisfy the URAA definition, they potentially have 
some allocative (“coupling”) effects, which arise with uncertainty, imperfect credit, land and 
labor markets and farmer expectations about future payments. In the presence of uncertainty, 
decoupled payments reduce risk aversion and the degree of risk. If credit markets are imperfect, 
decoupled payments have the potential to increase the liquidity of credit-constrained farmers. 
The payments also increase land values and rents, which also improves the credit worthiness of 
credit-constrained farmers and provides incentives to retain land in agriculture. Decoupled 
payments affect labor markets by influencing the on- and off-farm labor supply decisions. 
Decoupled payments affect farmer expectations by linking current decisions to future payments. 
Next, we review each coupling mechanism. The tables at the end of the paper summarize the 
results from the literature according to the coupling mechanisms, the evidence of their magnitude 
when available, and associated authors. 
 
3. Coupling through Risk 
If farmers’ preferences display decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), increases in wealth 
imply a reduction in the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (wealth effect). Decoupled 
payments also reduce the degree of risk faced by farmers by reducing income variability 
(insurance effect) (Hennessy, 1998). Hennessy models a risk-averse farmer, maximizing 
  4expected utility from profit. The farmer earns stochastic profit from the market, which is 
augmented by a decoupled payment. The farmer’s objective function is given by:  




α J π αϕε ε ∫     ( 1 )  
where α  is the farmer’s choice variable,  ˆ(,,) π αϕε  is the sum of stochastic market returns, 
(,) π αε  and decoupled support payment,  (,) DP ϕ ε . Under the conditions that (i) farmer’s 
preferences display DARA, (ii) the risk faced by the farmer reduces his optimal level of the 
choice variable ( αε π  > 0), (iii) support augmented income increases with risk ( ˆ (( , , )0 ) ε π αϕε >
, ) 0 )
 
and, (iv) the decoupled payment reduces the risk faced by the farmer (( DP ϕε ϕ ε ≤ , the 
optimal choice of the farmer increases with the magnitude of support. The author also shows that 
under constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and conditions (ii), (iii) and, (iv), the optimal 
choice of the farmer increases with the magnitude of support. In this case, wealth effects are 
absent; the optimal choice is only influenced by insurance effects due to the reduced income 
variability induced by the increase in support. Hennessy conducts numerical analysis for a 
continuous corn producer in the Midwest to obtain some measure of the magnitudes of the 
wealth and insurance effects of a target price program based on fixed yield. Monte Carlo 
simulations indicate that an increase in the magnitude of support could increase nitrogen use by a 
maximum of 15 %, while the increase in output is small (a maximum of 2.75%). Insurance 
effects are much larger than wealth effects. To ensure that decoupled payments do not have any 
insurance effects, Hennessy suggests that these payments should not vary with the source of 
uncertainty. 
Sckokai and Moro (2006) have findings similar to Hennessy’s. They use data from the Italian 
Farm Accounting Data Network to empirically evaluate the risk effects of the recent CAP 
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constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences. The estimated model is then used to simulate 
the effects of recent CAP reforms (reduced intervention prices compensated by an increase in 
cereal area payments and eventually SFP). Supplies of all arable crops are positively influenced 
by own area payments. The elasticity of crop acreage with respect to area payments is positive 
for all arable crops. The introduction of the non-stochastic SFP reduces income variability and 
offsets the impact of the increased price variability. Risk effects are decomposed into insurance 
and wealth effects. Additionally the policy change has price and payment effects which offset 
each other; while the wealth effects are positive but small, insurance effects are more important 
in determining the direction of the output effect of the policy change.  
Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder (2000) study the linkage between decoupled payments 
and production in the United States, Canada, and Mexico under uncertainty. They apply a three 
country computable general equilibrium model (CGE) in which the effect of the decoupled 
payment on production is captured through a change in the risk premium. Using 1997 data, they 
look at PFC in the United States, National Income Stabilization Accounts (NISA) in Canada (an 
effectively coupled payment) and Procampo in Mexico and analyze risk in returns for corn, 
wheat, feed grains and oilseeds. The authors abstract from risk management such as hedging or 
off-farm employment. Farmers in the United States and Canada are assumed to tolerate loss 
twice as often as farmers in Mexico do. The study examines the effect of a 50% increase in 
decoupled payments on risk premia. Risk premia decrease, though the effects on output via the 
decreased risk premia are small. U.S. output of oilseeds rises by 1.1% and output of wheat rises 
by 0.5%. Mexican output of wheat and feed grains increase by 0.7%, while the output of oilseeds 
fall by 0.3%, reflecting the shift in resources into more risky crops. 
Young and Westcott (2000) examine U.S. PFC payments, crop and revenue insurance, 
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wealth elasticities of acreage between 0.087 and 0.270 (from Chavas and Holt, 1990), the authors 
calculate the production impact of PFC payments on program crops (corn, barley, oats, sorghum, 
rice, wheat and upland cotton). PFC payments increased aggregate acreage by 0.18 to 0.57 
million acres annually, translating into a maximum increase in acreage of 2% over the period 
1996-2002. A shift of acreage towards riskier crops and regions also occurred. 
Anton and Le Mouel (2004) employ a mean-variance approach to compute the magnitude of 
the risk effects of CCP. They model a risk-averse farmer producing a single output facing 
stochastic prices. Her income, M, is given by the sum of stochastic profits, CCP and off-farm 
income. The farmer maximizes the certainty equivalent income, with respect to output, y. The 
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where LR is the commodity loan rate,  p  is the stochastic output price, E(M) is expected 
income, V(M) is the variance of income, Rr is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and  ' is 
marginal cost. The second term in brackets captures the price risk premium. The incentive price 
is defined as the expected price given the truncation of the price distribution at the loan rate less 
the price risk premium. A policy that decreases the price risk premium increases the incentive 
price and has a positive effect on production. Computing the price risk premium under normally 
distributed prices, the authors evaluate the risk related incentives for major commodities 
expressed as a percentage of the market price of the commodity. The assumed value of Rr matters 
but effects are overall small. The CCP program created risk-related effects in the magnitude of 
C
  70.9% for sorghum, 1.5% for corn and 1.9% for wheat. 
Serra et al. (2005a) analyze the impact of decoupled payments on production decisions taken 
at both the intensive and extensive levels in the presence of price uncertainty. The model 
assumes that farmers have two sources of income: market revenue from sales of a single output 
and decoupled payments (DP). The farmer maximizes expected utility from wealth. The analysis 
is based on the assumption of DARA. The authors derive expressions for the elasticity of output 
with respect to DP and the elasticity of output with respect to (stochastic) price. Both the 
elasticities are found to be analytically positive, indicating that increases in both DP and price 
increase output. While DP increases output only by reducing risk, a higher price increases output 
by increasing marginal income and by reducing risk. The authors specify a single aggregate 
output produced using two variable inputs, chemical inputs and fertilizers, and use farm-level 
data for the years 1998-2001 from Kansas, and national-level aggregate data. Results indicate 
that the DP elasticity is near zero and smaller than the price elasticity, with the former equal to 
0.006. Further, a reduction in price support, compensated exactly by an increase in decoupled 
payments, leads to a small reduction in output. Finally, the elimination of PFC payments would 
cause 6% of the farmers to exit.  
In a related paper, Serra et al. (2006) analyze the impact that decoupled payments have on 
production by explicitly considering the effect that inputs have on output variability when 
farmers face both output and price risk. For the single output, single input model, an increase in 
DP increases (decreases) the demand for the input if the farmer’s preferences display DARA 
(Increasing absolute risk aversion) and the input is risk increasing. This happens because the 
impact of DP on input use is determined by an interaction between the wealth effect (caused by 
the change in the coefficient of risk aversion brought about by a change in wealth) and the effect 
of the input on output variability. If the input is risk decreasing, the effect of DP on input use is 
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model with three inputs (pesticides, fertilizers, and seeds and fuel oil) and the data of Serra et al. 
(2005), the authors find that all inputs are risk increasing and that farmers in the sample exhibit 
DARA preferences. DP elasticities for the three inputs are positive, but statistically insignificant. 
Price elasticities for the inputs are positive, though only the elasticities for pesticide and fertilizer 
are statistically significant. A reduction in price support which is compensated by a decoupled 
payment may lead to a decrease in output mean and variance by reducing the use of risk-
increasing inputs. 
Makki, Johnson and Somwaru (2005) analyze the effects of CCP on farm-level income 
variability, crop choice and acreage allocation decisions by simulating an expected utility 
maximization model for a risk-averse representative Minnesota farmer facing price and output 
uncertainty. The farmer is assumed to buy revenue or yield insurance. The authors compare the 
certainty equivalent of the terminal period wealth under different assumptions about programs, 
acreage allocations and market conditions. The simulation exercise is conducted for the years 
2002-04. Results indicate that CCP increase farm welfare considerably, especially in low price 
years. Farmers may increase acreage of crops with higher CCP rates, especially if base updating 
is allowed, as it was under the 2002 FSRI Act.  
Goodwin and Mishra (2006) econometrically evaluate the effect of PFC and market loss 
assistance (MLA) payments on farm level decisions using farm-level data from USDA’s 
Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) for the period 1998-2001. They investigate 
the impact of current PFC and MLA payments on current acreage decisions of farmers. The 
empirical model is based on expected utility maximization of wealth, (initial wealth plus market 
returns, government payments and non-farm activities). The following reduced form acreage 
response equation is estimated:  
  9j
1 (, , ,, , ) t tt t t t t Af Ap w D P C P W − =  1 , −       ( 3 )  
where   is current acreage, At-1 is lagged acreage,  t A t p  is stochastic output price for the 
commodity, wt is input price, and Wt-1 is wealth. j
t CP  represent government payments which are 
conditioned on market conditions (LDP and MLA payments).  are fixed payments received 
by the producer. The estimation equations include PFC and MLA payments and also the indirect 
effects that PFC payments can have on farmers’ decisions via the farmers’ risk aversion. A 
farmer’s level of risk-aversion is represented by the proportion of his insurance bill as compared 
to his total expenditure. The PFC-insurance interaction term captures the effect that PFC 
payments can have on risk-aversion. The empirical model also includes the farm’s wealth, 
calculated as total assets less total debts, and PFC payments. The authors estimate acreage 
equations for corn, soybeans and wheat. They find that the direct effects of PFC payments on 
acreage decisions are positive and significant, except in the wheat acreage decision, though the 
magnitude of the impact is small. The coefficient of the PFC-insurance term in all three acreage 
equations is negative though insignificant. Wealth effects are also insignificant.  
t DP
The overall effect of a dollar increase in PFC payments is to increase corn, soybeans and 
wheat acreage by 0.92, 0.61 and 0.36 acres respectively corresponding to acreage elasticities of 
0.0317 for corn, 0.0204 for soybeans and 0.0428 for wheat. MLA effects on corn acreage are 
found to be stronger as compared to the effect of PFC payments, though the effect on soybeans 
and wheat are not significant. Table 1 summarizes this section. 
 
4. Coupling via Credit Constraints 
Decoupled payments can influence the investment decision of farmers by adding to their wealth, 
which might enable farmers to save more and therefore increase their investment. For capital-constrained 
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Somwaru, and Diao (2003) examine the economy-wide effect of decoupled payments on consumption 
and savings pattern. First, the paper examines the link between PFC payments and land values using data 
from statistical reporting districts in Minnesota from 1994 to 2000. Results indicate a positive correlation 
between government payments and land values; between 1994 and 2000 a 10% change in government 
payments led to a 3.24% change in land values. The appreciation in land values can affect investment by 
increasing the access to credit as land is used as collateral. Next, the authors examine the effects of PFC 
payments on investment under perfect and segmented capital markets using an inter-temporal three sector 
general equilibrium (GE) model. PFC payments are incorporated in the model as a lump-sum transfer 
from urban households to the rural households who undertake agricultural production. The model is 
calibrated to 1997 United States data. PFC payments are assumed to be $6.11 billion in 1997 and are paid 
in every period in perpetuity. The steady state solutions of the model with and without (defined as the 
benchmark) the PFC payments are compared. With perfectly integrated capital markets, the sole effect of 
PFC payments is on land values, which exceeds the benchmark by 9% in the short run and by about 8% in 
the long run. With imperfect capital markets the rental rate of capital in agriculture declines by 0.1% in 
the first 10 years as compared to the benchmark. The effect on rental rate of capital outside agriculture is 
negligible. The price of land and hence the value of land rises. Farmers increase their level of capital 
stock, and as they do so, also employ more labor. Thus higher labor hours are employed in agriculture 
over the benchmark. Aggregate agricultural production increases by a maximum of 0.18% over the 
benchmark, a very small effect. All these effects occur in the short run. In the long run, the differences in 
the rental rates of capital in agriculture and outside agriculture are arbitraged away and there is 
convergence to the benchmark. Thus, PFC payments do not have any effects in the long run.  
Goodwin and Mishra (2006), earlier discussed in section 3, also empirically estimate the 
impact of PFC payments on easing credit constraints faced by farmers. Credit constraints are 
represented by the debt-to-asset ratio of the farm. The PFC-(debt-to-asset ratio) interaction term 
captures the effect that PFC payments might have on the farm’s financial leverage. However, the 
  11interaction term is not statistically significant in the corn, soybeans and wheat acreage equations. 
Table 2 recapitulates this section’s information. 
 
5. Coupling through Labor Allocation 
Decoupled payments can have a significant effect on farmers’ on-farm and off-farm labor supply 
decisions. Farmers do not view on-farm and off-farm work as having similar characteristics. As 
Key and Roberts (2008) note, farmers can derive nonpecuniary benefits from farming and the 
receipt of decoupled payments leads to an increase in on-farm labor supply. Another explanation 
could be that the receipt of decoupled payments increases farmers’ liquidity and hence reduces 
their reliability on off-farm work. Ahearn, El-Osta and Dewbre (2006) investigate the effect that 
government payments have on the off-farm labor participation decision of farm operator 
households using ARMS data for the years 1996 and 1999 and a bivariate probit approach. They 
find that PFC, LDP, and MLA payments, individually and in aggregate reduce the probability of 
the farmer to work off the farm. The estimation results for the spouse are more ambiguous.  
In an investigation also based on recent ARMS data, Dewbre and Mishra (2002) estimate the 
effect that PFC, MLA, LDP and disaster assistance payments have on the leisure time and on-
farm hours of operators and spouses. The impact of the PFC payments on on-farm labor hours is 
negative yet statistically insignificant. PFC payments have a positive and significant impact on 
leisure hours though the effect is very small in magnitude. The authors conclude that PFC 
payments are decoupled. The authors also focus on transfer efficiency losses arising from 
reallocation of farm resources caused by the government payments and leakages of benefits to 
non-farming landowners. Transfer efficiency is measured as the impact of the payments on the 
total income of households. PFC has the lowest transfer efficiency (0.29) for households with 
some off-farm income amongst the payments considered and also the highest transfer efficiency 
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El-Osta, Mishra and Ahearn (2004) estimate the effect of PFC, LDP, and disaster assistance 
payments on on- and off-farm labor and total labor supply using 2001 ARMS data. They find 
that combined payments have a positive effect on on-farm and total labor hours supplied and a 
negative effect on off-farm labor supply. Operators increased their on-farm labor hours while 
cutting down on both off-farm labor as well as leisure time. When each government payment is 
considered individually, PFC payments have a positive significant impact on on-farm labor hours 
and a negative significant impact on off-farm labor hours. No significant effect is found on total 
labor supply.  
Key and Roberts (2009) develop a household model where farmers make labor allocation 
decisions to maximize utility. It is assumed that farmers derive utility from consumption, leisure 
and nonpecuniary benefits from farming. The authors employ an additive utility function. Under 
the assumption of decreasing marginal utility of income, the authors find that an increase in DP 
leads to a reallocation of labor towards on-farm work and away from off-farm work. The 
explanation of this result is based on the nonpecuniary benefits that farmers receive from 
farming. Because of the nonpecuniary benefits, farmers prefer on-farm work to off-farm work 
for the same wage rate. Using data from 2002-04 ARMS data, the authors find evidence of 
nonpecuniary benefits by empirically estimating the wage differential between on-farm and off-
farm work. For the entire sample, they find the off-farm hourly wage rate to be $24 higher than 
the on-farm wage rate. Table 3 sums up the points made by these papers. 
 
6. Coupling via Land Markets 
Decoupled payments are passed on to landowners via higher land rents and land values. This can 
lead to land remaining in agriculture and also as mentioned earlier can make credit more 
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increase in land values, even in the long run. One of the earliest articles to raise this issue was 
Schertz and Johnston (1998). The authors conduct a study in four major agricultural regions: the 
Great Plains, the Corn Belt, the South and California. The study is based on the responses of 
farm managers or operators to the 1996 FAIR Act. Based on their discussions with the farm 
managers the authors conclude that owing to their non-stochastic nature, PFC payments inflate 
land prices and land rents. PFC payments increase land values as they are attached to the land. In 
the case of cash leases much of the payments pass on to the landowner via increased rents. In the 
case of crop share leases, payments create incentives for the landowner to adjust the lease to take 
advantage of the PFC payments (for example in some cases landowners shifted to cash leases). 
Gohin, Guyomard, and le Mouel (2000) analyze the impact of direct payments on land and 
production. They evaluate them in terms of their eligibility to qualify as green-box payments. 
They use a static partial equilibrium model with two perfectly competitive agricultural sectors, 
each producing a single output, with a constant returns-to-scale production technology. 
Production in the two sectors depends on the use of three inputs: an aggregate variable input, a 
specific primary factor, and a fixed allocable factor such as land, which is used in both sectors 
and is in fixed supply. The domestic support instruments considered include output subsidies, 
variable input subsidies, and DP based on the specific factor, and on land. Optimal output supply 
and derived input demands are determined by a two-stage profit maximization process. Land 
prices are determined endogenously by the market clearing condition for land. Land prices are 
computed under two alternative assumptions: land homogeneity and heterogeneity. Comparative-
static analysis indicates that the land use and output supply in each sector depend on both 
sectors’ DP and output subsidy. The effect of the DP depends on the use of other support 
measures and the production technology. Two countries with different production technologies 
  14or different factor movements across sectors will have different impacts from using the same 
direct support instrument.  
Barnard et al. (2001) analyze the effects of commodity program payments on cropland values 
using 2000 county-level farmland value data from ARMS. They estimate hedonic land price 
equations with all government payments (which include PFC, LDP, MLA and disaster assistance 
payments) grouped together as a single variable. Results indicate that the commodity program 
payments have a significant effect on cropland values. The highest proportional effect was in the 
Heartland region (includes Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, and parts of Ohio, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Kentucky, South Dakota and Nebraska.) where farm commodity programs accounted for 24% of 
the market value of farmland. Farm commodity programs also had a similar effect in the Prairie 
Gateway region (includes Kansas, and parts of Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Nebraska and 
Colorado) (23% of the market value of farmland) and in the Northern Great Plains region 
(includes North Dakota, most of South Dakota, and parts of Montana, Minnesota, Wyoming, 
Colorado and Nebraska) (22% of the market value of farmland). Even though all payments have 
been grouped together, the authors mention that PFC payments are expected to have a larger 
impact on land values as compared to the coupled LDP and disaster assistance payments. This is 
because the coupled payments can increase production and therefore increase the demand for 
other non-land inputs. Thus, benefits from the coupled payments may be transferred to other 
inputs and not all benefits are capitalized into higher land values. PFC payments are paid on 
land, and being lump-sum in nature, they are not expected to influence production. Hence, all 
benefits from the PFC payments are expected to be capitalized into higher land values. In 
contrast, Goodwin, Mishra and Ortalo-Magne (2003a) and (2003b), found LDP and disaster 
assistance payments have a larger impact on land values as compared to the PFC payments. 
Dewbre, Anton and Thompson (2001) employ the policy evaluation matrix (PEM) model to 
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providing income support. Since they are based on land use, these DP are considered as area 
payments and are further classified into two types: one requiring production for eligibility and 
the other that land be kept in arable use. The authors also compare the area payments with 
market price support, input subsidies and output payments. The paper focuses on the impacts of 
the support measures through their incidence on relative prices. The impact of area payments on 
production, trade and farm income arise because of their impact on land prices. The results from 
model simulation indicate that the area payments have the smallest effect on trade as compared 
to the other three forms of support. Within the area payments, the one requiring no active 
production has a smaller effect on trade than the one which requires mandatory production. 
Market price supports have a smaller impact on trade as compared to the input subsidies. In fact, 
input subsidies prove to be the most inefficient form of support in terms of providing income 
support while area payments prove to be the most efficient. 
Roberts, Kirwan and Hopkins (2003) examine the incidence of government payments on land 
rents using micro data from the 1992 and 1997 US Agricultural Census. Results indicate that 
government payments had a significant impact on land rents. For 1997, rents increased between 
$0.33 and $1.55 for each government payment dollar (in 1997 the major component of 
government payments were payments made under the PFC program). For 1992, the effect on 
land rents is smaller reflecting the temporary nature of government payments in that year.  
Goodwin, Mishra and Ortalo-Magne (2003a) and (2003b) use farm level data from ARMS to 
estimate the determinants of farmland values. While the first study (2003a) uses data for the 
years 1998-2001, the second study (2003b) uses data for the years 1998-2000. The current value 
of farmland is affected by the sum of the expected future cash flows discounted according to the 
risk of these cash flows. Cash flows from the same source have the same discount factor. The 
  16authors consider three sources of future cash flows: market returns, government payments (PFC, 
LDP and disaster assistance) and the nonagricultural returns to land. Each government program 
has been considered separately in the analysis as programs differ according to support provided. 
The uncertainty associated with each program differs. They find that PFC payments have a 
positive and significant effect on farmland values; a dollar increase in PFC payments leads to an 
increase in per-acre land values of $4.94 in the first study and of $4.06 in the second study.  
Frandsen, Gersfelt and Jensen (2003) employ a computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model to analyze the production and trade impacts of decoupling income support in the EU. The 
model accounts for the support measures in the CAP and the Agenda 2000 reforms. The model 
baseline is constructed for the period 1997-2013 and captures the structure of the domestic 
support in the EU. The baseline is compared with three scenarios. Of interest to us is the scenario 
where all domestic support is converted into a single region specific decoupled payment to land. 
Under this scenario, there is a substantial increase of 75.1% in land prices for the EU15 as a 
whole. All individual EU countries also display increases in land prices. Other results are a 
decrease in the production of wheat, other grains, oilseeds and bovine animals by 6.9%, 5.6%, 
8.9% and 11% respectively. Most affected are plant based fibers, such as cotton whose 
production decreases by 63%. These decreases are reflective of the high level of domestic 
support enjoyed by these commodities under Agenda 2000. 
Gohin (2006) analyzes the impact of the 2003 CAP Mid Term Review (MTR) under two 
different assumptions about the modeling of Agenda 2000 direct payments. The first is based on 
the standard approach employed in other studies that have examined the effect of CAP MTR 
reforms, under which there is full capitalization of the arable crop direct payments by 2008 and 
beef premia are not limited by any maximum limit. Under the second assumption, there is a 50% 
capitalization of the arable crop direct payments by 2008 and beef premia are paid on a limited 
  17number of animals. Under both assumptions, direct payments are based on land use and therefore 
increase land rents (by 164% under the first assumption and 38.5% under the second). A static, 
single-country, multi-sector GE model of the EU15 economy with perfect competition in all 
markets and constant returns to scale technology is employed. The author focuses on the soft 
wheat sector for the analysis. The model is calibrated to 1995 data from Eurostat. Policy 
variables were calibrated using FEOGA/WTO notifications. The CAP MTR scenario entails that 
Agenda 2000 arable crop direct payments are reduced by 90%, the slaughter premium on adult 
animals is reduced by 80% and the suckler cow premium and the special beef premium are 
reduced by 50% and 90% respectively. It is also assumed that the SFP has no market effects. The 
simulation results indicate that under both assumptions, land rents decrease by at least 80%. 
There are also negative impacts on arable crop and beef production. The results with the first 
assumption are similar to the other studies: soft wheat and beef production decrease by 1.6% and 
3.6% respectively. The results with the second assumption are in the same direction but the 
magnitude of the impact differs with a decrease of 7.3% in soft wheat production and a 1.2% 
decrease in beef production. The varying results suggest that the impacts of the CAP MTR are 
sensitive to the modeling of the Agenda 2000 direct payments. Another conclusion that can be 
drawn from the results of the alternative modeling of the Agenda 2000 arable crop direct 
payments is that the payments seem to have a moderate degree of coupling.  
Goodwin and Mishra (2006), earlier discussed in sections 3 and 4, also investigate the impact 
of PFC payments on the allocation of land across alternate practices such as conservation 
reserves, pasture, fallow and other idling practices. They find that PFC payments lead to less 
idling of land. The authors also investigate if PFC payments led to the acquisition of new land. 
The authors find that PFC payments may lead to more land ownership transactions, though the 
effect is not significant. Table 4 recaps these papers on coupling through land markets. 
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7. Coupling from Farmer Expectations on Future Policy Changes 
Farmers form expectations on future decoupled payments. The latter are often based on historical 
behavior which then “couples” current production decisions to these expected future payments. 
Lagerkvist and Olson (2002) analyze anticipatory adjustments made by farmers to the 1996 
FAIR Act using a sample of Minnesota farmers. Both the timing and the size of the support are 
considered to be stochastic. The farmer has well defined probability distribution functions for the 
timing and the size of the reform. The farmer maximizes net receipts subject to a binding 
dividend constraint derived from the budget constraint of the farm business. Assuming that the 
farmer continuously updates his information, the authors convert the dynamic stochastic problem 
into two deterministic control problems for the pre-reform and post-reform periods. The solution 
indicates that the pre-reform debt-to-asset ratio differs from the post-reform ratio. The former 
includes an additional term which captures the anticipatory optimal debt adjustment to a future 
reform of farm policy. The adjustment is comprised of the expectation effect (relating to the 
uncertainty in the size of the reform) and the timing effect (relating to the uncertainty in the 
timing of the reform). The authors estimate the pre-reform and post-reform debt-to-asset ratio for 
an anticipated reduction in support using data from the Southwestern Minnesota Farm Business 
Management Association records for 1989-1998 using the generalized method of moments 
estimator. The empirical results indicate the presence of anticipatory adjustments in the debt-to-
asset ratio due to the expected change in the post-reform support. 
In a related investigation, Lagerkvist (2005) applies the framework in Lagerkvist and Olson 
(2002) to analyze the impacts of the CAP MTR reform of the area payments on the incentives for 
farmland investment among Swedish farmers. The paper provides an explanation for the 
fluctuations in farmland investment based on agricultural policy uncertainty. The required rate of 
  19return (ROR) for farmland investment is used to capture farmland investment incentives. The 
short-term ROR includes the impact of incentive adjustment to a future reform in the area 
payments. Numerical analysis based on survey data from a sample of Swedish farmers indicates 
that the pre-reform ROR under timing uncertainty is less than the ROR with complete certainty. 
Further, the pre-reform ROR under both timing and post-reform area payment uncertainty is less 
than the ROR under only timing uncertainty under a nonpositive correlation between the timing 
of the reform and the post-reform payment.  
Sumner (2003) analyzes the impact of an expected base update on the supply response of 
program crops by constructing the degree of linkage between future payments that might involve 
base updating and current production and evaluating how this is affected by a current update. 
The degree of linkage depends among other factors on the probability that the program remains 
operative in the future, the probability that an update occurs and how the new base affects future 
payments relative to the current program. The degree of linkage is sensitive to the probabilities 
and discount factor used. Under high degree of linkage, payments such as the direct payments or 
CCP which are affected by base updating in the future, strongly influence  current production. 
McIntosh, Shogren and Dohlman (2006) use experimental economics to study the effects of 
CCP and base acre updating on supply response under price and policy uncertainty. Each 
participant is endowed with “tokens,” representing base acres to be invested in either a “Blue” 
option (representing a program crop) or a “Red” option (representing a non-program crop or a 
crop that has not been planted earlier) or a combination of the two. These allocation decisions are 
made under three situations: (i) participants face only price uncertainty (baseline case), (ii) they 
face price uncertainty and receive CCP (CCP case) and, (iii) they face price and policy 
uncertainty and also receive CCP (policy risk case). The results indicate that CCP increased the 
investment in the program crop (Blue option). There was a 5.43% shift in base acres towards the 
  20program crop with the CCP case as compared to the baseline. Under the policy risk case there 
was a shift of 7.92% in base acres towards the program crop. These results provide evidence that 
both the CCP and the possibility of future base updating do create some incentives for farmers to 
plant more of the program crops than that indicated by market returns. 
Coble, Miller and Hudson (2008) use survey data from Iowa and Mississippi to analyze what 
expectations farmers have from future farm bills including expectations regarding future base 
update. In the survey, they ask questions regarding the probability of base and program yield 
update for DP and CCP, whether payment rates will change or remain the same and if farmers 
made any adjustments in acreage or input use to affect future program payments. On average, the 
surveyed farmers believed that there was a 40% chance that base or yield updates would be 
allowed, though only 17% of those surveyed said that they would make adjustments in acreage 
planted or input use. The authors also use a censored probit model with the dependent variable as 
the willingness to accept (WTA) a one time payment in-lieu of an opportunity to update base. 
The WTA captures the value that farmers place on the opportunity to update base. They find that 
greater expectation of an update and a higher percent of farm income increases the WTA. The 
mean WTA across the two states was $48.16 per acre. 
Bhaskar and Beghin (2008) analyze the impact of farmer expectations about the possibility to 
update base acreage and program yield on a farmer’s acreage and fertilizer use decision under 
price, yield and policy uncertainty using a stochastic dynamic programming approach. They 
consider a risk-averse farmer producing corn, earning income from the sale of his crop and 
government payments. There is policy uncertainty about the possibility of base acreage and 
program yield update in the 2007 Farm Bill. The farmer’s subjective probability about the 
expected updates is discretized into five values, between 0 and 1 in increments of 0.25. The 
farmer maximizes the present value of expected utility by choosing acreage and fertilizer use 
  21during 2003-06 taking into account the possibility of a base acreage and program yield update. 
The choice variables, the acreage planted and fertilizer use in 2003-06, are discretized into eight 
and four values each. Price and yield shocks are the state variables which are discretized into 
eight and two states each. There are two possible income streams in 2007-2011; one when 
updates are allowed and the other when no updates are allowed. The farmer weighs the two 
possible future income streams with its prior subjective probability of updates. In this way, the 
latter affects the acreage and fertilizer use decisions in the 2003-06 period. The results are 
presented in terms of the average of the optimal planted acreage, over 2003-06, and the average 
yield resulting from optimal fertilizer use over 2003-06. The authors find that optimal acreage 
and yield in 2003-06 are weakly-increasing in the subjective probability of the updates. They 
also find that the maximum percent increase in acreage is 6.25% and the maximum percent 
increase in yield is 0.134%. In sum, the effects through expectations appear tangible although 
small. Table 5 presents the summary for these papers on expectations. 
 
8. Other Coupling Linkages and Allocative Effects 
A few papers do not fit in the conceptual underpinnings of the previous taxonomy. Using some 
reduced forms, Adams et al. (2001) econometrically estimate the effect of PFC and MLA 
payments on the total area planted in eleven states for wheat, corn, sorghum, barley, oats, cotton, 
rice and soybeans, using annual state level data for the years 1997-2001. The authors test two 
hypotheses; firstly whether PFC and MLA payments affect the total area planted and secondly 
whether PFC and MLA payments have the same effect as market returns and marketing loans on 
the total area planted. The empirical results indicate that PFC and MLA payments do have some 
effect on the area planted. Empirical results for testing the second hypothesis do not provide 
clear indication whether PFC and MLA payments have different effects on area planted than 
  22market returns and marketing loans. The authors conclude that results in this paper provide only 
weak evidence that PFC and MLA payments have some effect on the total area planted. The 
results in the study are based on the assumptions that the elasticities are the same across states 
and on naive expectations on part of the farmers’ in the computation of expected market returns 
and expected MLA payments. A similar analysis is conducted by Beckman and Wailes (2005) 
who analyze the impact of direct payments and CCP in the 2002 FSRI Act on acreage supply 
response for rice. They find that DP are decoupled while a $1 increase in CCP per-year increases 
rice area harvested by 956.29 thousand acres for the six major U.S. rice producing states. 
Guyomard, Le Mouel, and Gohin (2004) compare the effectiveness of four support 
mechanisms (an output subsidy, a land subsidy, and decoupled payments with and without 
mandatory production, DPm and DP respectively) on achieving four policy objectives: providing 
income support, increasing the number of farmers, reducing the negative externalities from non-
land input usage and keeping trade effects at a minimum. A support mechanism is considered to 
be more efficient than the other support mechanisms, if for the same budgetary costs, it has a 
higher impact on the four policy objectives mentioned above. The analytical model is based on 
three equilibrium equations representing equilibrium in the output and land markets and an 
entry-exit condition. DP does not appear in any of the three equations. It only achieves the policy 
objective of providing income support. DPm on the other hand has a positive effect on the 
number of farmers, though its effect on output price and land price is ambiguous. The authors 
find that none of the four policy instruments dominate in terms of efficiency in all the four policy 
goals. DP is most efficient when it comes to supporting farmers’ income with the least distortion 
of trade. Land subsidies are the most efficient in reducing the negative externalities from non-
land input use while decoupled payments with mandatory production are the most efficient in 
maintaining or increasing the number of farmers. 
  23Chau and de Gorter (2005) examine the effects of decoupled payments on exit decisions of 
farmers. It is their contention that decoupled payments subsidize production and at times cross-
subsidize exports. In the model set up by the authors, producers receive both coupled and 
decoupled support. The coupled payment is modeled as an ad-valorem subsidy, which is 
incorporated in the price they receive for exports. The decoupled payment is a lump-sum 
payment, DP. The producers incur fixed and variable costs. The fixed costs are assumed to be 
firm specific. The model results indicate that DP allows producers to cover fixed costs, thereby 
allowing those with higher fixed costs to remain in production, who would have exited 
otherwise. Thus DP do not affect an individual producer’s output, rather it affects aggregate 
output and exports by influencing the exit decision of producers. The model is calibrated to 1998 
U.S. wheat production to compare the effects of PFC and LDP payments. Fixed costs are 
assumed to be normally distributed. In the long run when it is possible to exit, the removal of 
PFC payments causes 3% of the producers to exit, leading to a reduction in output and exports. 
Serra et al. (2005b) examine the effect that decoupling of support has on the environment by 
analyzing the effect of post-MacSharry CAP reforms on the use of pest control inputs in the 
cereal, oilseed and protein crop (COP) sector. The model specifies damage abatement functions 
to capture the contribution of the pest control inputs in reducing crop damage. The authors derive 
expressions for the elasticity of the demand of pest control inputs with respect to price support 
measures and per hectare compensatory payments. They hypothesize and find that the input 
response to DP is less than their response to price, using a sample of French farms from the Farm 
Accounting Data Network for the period 1994-1999. The model is then shocked with CAP 
reforms (decrease in cereal intervention prices, and increase in area payments). Area payments 
for oilseeds and protein crops are reduced. These policy changes result in a reduction in the use 
of crop protection inputs by a little more than 3%, and a shift away from oilseed/protein crops 
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protection inputs is reduced by 11%. Cereal acreage falls while oilseeds and protein crops 
acreage remains almost constant. Table 6 summarizes these last papers. 
 
9. Conclusion 
There has been a move towards decoupled support away from coupled support consistent with 
the 1994 URAA. However, as seen above, decoupled payments do influence farmers’ decisions. 
Our review identifies five major coupling channels of decoupled payments: (i) they affect the 
risk faced by farmers, either by reducing their level of risk aversion (wealth effects) or by 
reducing the risk they face (insurance effects), (ii) they ease credit constraints faced by farmers, 
(iii) they affect the labor allocation decisions of farm households, (iv) they alter land values, 
rents and land prices, and (v) they influence farmers decisions through expectations about future 
payments. Less often mentioned, decoupled payments can also influence the entry and exit 
decisions of farmers and have some effect on the environment by influencing input usage.  
Although decoupled payments are not fully “decoupled” as the research suggests that they 
influence farmers’ decisions through the channels identified above, the magnitude of these 
impacts was found to be small in most cases. One exception is with respect to land markets. 
Since most decoupled payments (be it the PFC, direct payments or the CAP area payments) are 
land based and non-stochastic, they tend to be capitalized into higher land values which increase 
land rents and prices. This feature could lead to land remaining in agricultural use rather than 
being converted into non-agrarian alternate uses. Wealth effects though positive are small in 
magnitude and insurance effects are more important than wealth effects in determining the 
impact of decoupled payments. Decoupled payments also influence crop choice, since the 
payments vary by crops, and some crops are not eligible to receive payments.  
  25An important and unresolved issue is to know the cumulative impact of these individually 
small effects coming from each coupling mechanism. Could it be that when combined together, 
risk aversion, wealth effects, credit constraints, expectations, base update, and linkages through 
input markets have a substantial impact on production? Goodwin and Mishra (2006) have 
econometrically analyzed the cumulative effects of risk aversion, wealth effects, and credit 
constraints. They left out expectations of future decoupled payments , base update, and labor 
market linkages and captured risk aversion in a roundabout way without explicit 
parameterization. Numerical methods would allow a more explicit characterization of risk 
aversion and account for expectations and base and yield updates. 
Decoupled payments have been a step toward reducing the distortions caused by domestic 
farm subsidies, but there is scope for further decoupling. This can be achieved by changing 
eligibility requirements in some cases (for example removing the restriction that fruits and 
vegetables are not eligible for payments in the case of direct payments in the United States), by 
requiring eligibility to be satisfied at the farm level (for example area payments in the CAP have 
base acreage restriction at the national or regional level, which still creates incentives at the farm 
level to increase acreage) and by ensuring that the eligibility to receive payments do not change 
after the inception of the decoupled payment program.  
The implementation of decoupled programs calls into question the current definition of the 
green-box payments in the WTO. There is a need for reevaluating the eligibility criteria of the 
green box payments. Right now eligibility criteria do not take into account the farmer’s response 
under uncertainty, or the fact that the impact of similarly designed programs can differ across 
countries, and even across sectors within a country (Gohin, Guyomard, and le Mouel (2000)). 
Also some eligibility criteria are ambiguous (for example it is not specified if eligibility criteria 
should be satisfied at the farm level, at the sub-sectoral level or at the sectoral level).  
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l
s
e
e
d
s
0
.
0
2
2
(
P
r
o
c
a
m
p
o
i
n
M
e
x
i
c
o
)
w
i
t
h
r
i
s
k
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
o
v
e
r
1
9
9
7
l
e
v
e
l
s
.
M
e
x
i
c
o
W
h
e
a
t
0
.
0
1
4
a
n
d
F
e
e
d
g
r
a
i
n
s
M
e
x
i
c
o
O
i
l
s
e
e
d
s
-
0
.
0
0
6
Y
o
u
n
g
a
n
d
W
e
s
t
c
o
t
t
(
2
0
0
0
)
-
-
A
c
r
e
a
g
e
:
d
"
i
n
D
P
o
f
$
3
6
b
n
)
"
b
y
0
.
6
4
-
2
%
(
P
F
C
)
o
v
e
r
1
9
9
6
-
2
0
0
2
o
v
e
r
1
9
9
6
-
2
0
0
2
A
n
t
´
o
n
a
n
d
L
e
M
o
u
¨
e
l
(
2
0
0
4
)
M
e
a
n
-
v
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
N
u
m
e
r
i
c
a
l
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
b
a
s
e
d
I
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
p
r
i
c
e
:
e
C
o
r
n
"
b
y
1
.
5
%
(
C
C
P
)
o
n
1
9
9
9
O
E
C
D
d
a
t
a
,
W
h
e
a
t
"
b
y
1
.
9
%
2
0
0
1
-
0
3
L
o
a
n
r
a
t
e
s
S
o
r
g
h
u
m
"
b
y
0
.
9
%
a
n
d
2
0
0
2
-
0
3
C
C
P
r
a
t
e
s
S
e
r
r
a
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
5
a
)
E
U
m
a
x
i
m
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
u
n
d
e
r
D
A
R
A
E
c
o
n
o
m
e
t
r
i
c
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
O
u
t
p
u
t
f
0
.
0
0
6
(
P
F
C
)
u
s
i
n
g
F
u
l
l
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
M
L
g
E
l
i
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
D
P
)
6
%
F
a
r
m
s
a
n
d
f
a
r
m
-
l
e
v
e
l
d
a
t
a
E
x
i
t
I
n
p
u
t
:
C
h
e
m
i
c
a
l
I
n
p
u
t
0
.
0
0
6
4
F
e
r
t
i
l
i
z
e
r
0
.
0
0
6
4
S
e
r
r
a
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
6
)
E
U
m
a
x
i
m
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
u
n
d
e
r
D
A
R
A
E
c
o
n
o
m
e
t
r
i
c
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
u
s
i
n
g
(
P
F
C
)
N
o
n
-
l
i
n
e
a
r
3
s
t
a
g
e
L
S
h
;
I
n
p
u
t
:
P
e
s
t
i
c
i
d
e
s
3
.
4
6
E
-
6
3
s
t
a
g
e
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
i
z
e
d
L
S
F
e
r
t
i
l
i
z
e
r
3
.
9
0
E
-
6
a
n
d
f
a
r
m
-
l
e
v
e
l
d
a
t
a
O
t
h
e
r
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
n
p
u
t
s
5
.
7
9
E
-
6
(
s
e
e
d
,
f
u
e
l
o
i
l
e
t
c
.
)
a
T
h
e
s
p
e
c
i
ﬁ
c
d
e
c
o
u
p
l
e
d
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
i
s
m
e
n
t
i
o
n
e
d
b
e
l
o
w
i
n
b
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
.
b
I
t
a
l
i
c
i
z
e
d
e
l
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
i
e
s
r
e
ﬂ
e
c
t
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
i
n
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
.
c
E
U
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
E
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
U
t
i
l
i
t
y
.
d
A
c
r
e
a
g
e
i
s
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
U
.
S
.
a
c
r
e
a
g
e
o
f
7
c
r
o
p
s
r
e
c
e
i
v
i
n
g
P
F
C
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
;
c
o
r
n
,
g
r
a
i
n
s
o
r
g
h
u
m
,
o
a
t
s
,
b
a
r
l
e
y
,
w
h
e
a
t
,
u
p
l
a
n
d
c
o
t
t
o
n
a
n
d
r
i
c
e
.
e
T
h
e
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
p
r
i
c
e
i
s
d
e
ﬁ
n
e
d
a
s
t
h
e
t
r
u
n
c
a
t
e
d
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
p
r
i
c
e
(
t
r
u
n
c
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
p
r
i
c
e
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
a
t
t
h
e
l
o
a
n
r
a
t
e
)
l
e
s
s
t
h
e
p
r
i
c
e
r
i
s
k
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
.
T
h
e
C
C
P
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
r
e
d
u
c
e
t
h
e
r
i
s
k
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
w
h
i
c
h
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
t
h
e
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
p
r
i
c
e
o
f
c
o
m
m
o
d
i
t
i
e
s
.
f
O
u
t
p
u
t
i
s
a
q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
i
n
d
e
x
t
h
a
t
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
w
h
e
a
t
,
c
o
r
n
,
g
r
a
i
n
s
o
r
g
h
u
m
a
n
d
s
o
y
b
e
a
n
s
.
T
h
i
s
d
e
ﬁ
n
i
t
i
o
n
o
f
o
u
t
p
u
t
a
l
s
o
a
p
p
l
i
e
s
t
o
S
e
r
r
a
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
6
)
.
g
M
L
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
M
a
x
i
m
u
m
L
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
.
h
L
S
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
L
e
a
s
t
S
q
u
a
r
e
s
.
31T
a
b
l
e
1
C
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
P
a
p
e
r
s
M
e
t
h
o
d
o
l
o
g
y
E
l
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
A
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
E
m
p
i
r
i
c
a
l
/
N
u
m
e
r
i
c
a
l
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
n
o
t
e
d
G
o
o
d
w
i
n
a
n
d
M
i
s
h
r
a
(
2
0
0
6
)
E
U
m
a
x
i
m
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
E
c
o
n
o
m
e
t
r
i
c
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
u
s
i
n
g
A
c
r
e
a
g
e
:
a
C
o
r
n
0
.
0
3
4
4
(
P
F
C
)
t
h
e
t
w
o
-
s
t
e
p
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
b
S
o
y
b
e
a
n
s
0
.
0
2
4
6
a
n
d
f
a
r
m
-
l
e
v
e
l
d
a
t
a
W
h
e
a
t
0
.
0
3
3
3
S
c
k
o
k
a
i
a
n
d
M
o
r
o
(
2
0
0
6
)
D
u
a
l
E
U
m
o
d
e
l
u
n
d
e
r
C
R
R
A
E
c
o
n
o
m
e
t
r
i
c
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
u
s
i
n
g
O
u
t
p
u
t
:
C
o
r
n
0
.
0
1
4
(
A
r
e
a
P
a
y
m
e
n
t
)
t
h
e
t
w
o
-
s
t
e
p
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
b
D
u
r
u
m
W
h
e
a
t
0
.
0
7
2
a
n
d
f
a
r
m
-
l
e
v
e
l
d
a
t
a
O
t
h
e
r
C
e
r
e
a
l
s
0
.
0
8
7
O
i
l
s
e
e
d
s
0
.
0
1
5
A
c
r
e
a
g
e
:
C
o
r
n
0
.
0
1
4
D
u
r
u
m
W
h
e
a
t
0
.
0
5
6
0
O
t
h
e
r
C
e
r
e
a
l
s
0
.
0
8
8
O
i
l
s
e
e
d
s
0
.
0
0
5
a
T
h
e
a
c
r
e
a
g
e
e
l
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
i
e
s
h
e
r
e
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
t
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
f
t
h
e
P
F
C
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
o
n
t
h
e
l
e
v
e
l
o
f
r
i
s
k
a
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
a
n
d
o
n
t
h
e
ﬁ
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
l
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
o
f
t
h
e
f
a
r
m
.
I
n
t
h
e
p
a
p
e
r
t
h
e
c
o
e
f
ﬁ
c
i
e
n
t
s
o
n
t
h
e
P
F
C
-
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
a
n
d
P
F
C
-
(
d
e
b
t
t
o
a
s
s
e
t
r
a
t
i
o
)
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
t
e
r
m
s
a
r
e
f
o
u
n
d
t
o
b
e
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
i
n
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
.
b
F
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
S
h
o
n
k
w
i
l
e
r
a
n
d
Y
e
n
(
1
9
9
9
)
.
32T
a
b
l
e
2
:
I
m
p
e
r
f
e
c
t
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
M
a
r
k
e
t
/
C
r
e
d
i
t
C
o
n
s
t
r
a
i
n
t
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
D
e
c
o
u
p
l
e
d
P
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
P
a
p
e
r
s
M
e
t
h
o
d
o
l
o
g
y
E
l
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
A
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
E
m
p
i
r
i
c
a
l
/
N
u
m
e
r
i
c
a
l
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
n
o
t
e
d
R
o
e
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
3
)
I
n
t
e
r
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
l
M
o
d
e
l
i
s
c
a
l
i
b
r
a
t
e
d
"
i
n
D
P
b
y
$
6
.
1
1
b
n
a
)
A
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
a
l
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
"
b
y
a
m
a
x
i
-
(
P
F
C
)
t
h
r
e
e
-
s
e
c
t
o
r
C
G
E
m
o
d
e
l
t
o
1
9
9
7
U
.
S
.
d
a
t
a
i
n
t
h
e
U
.
S
.
m
u
m
o
f
0
.
1
8
%
R
e
n
t
a
l
r
a
t
e
o
n
a
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
a
l
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
#
b
y
0
.
1
%
L
a
n
d
P
r
i
c
e
,
l
a
b
o
r
h
o
u
r
s
a
n
d
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
-
l
a
b
o
r
r
a
t
i
o
i
n
a
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
"
G
o
o
d
w
i
n
a
n
d
M
i
s
h
r
a
(
2
0
0
6
)
E
U
m
a
x
i
m
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
E
c
o
n
o
m
e
t
r
i
c
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
u
s
i
n
g
A
c
r
e
a
g
e
:
b
C
o
r
n
0
.
0
3
4
4
(
P
F
C
)
t
h
e
t
w
o
-
s
t
e
p
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
S
o
y
b
e
a
n
s
0
.
0
2
4
6
a
n
d
f
a
r
m
-
l
e
v
e
l
d
a
t
a
W
h
e
a
t
0
.
0
3
3
3
a
T
h
e
p
a
p
e
r
a
s
s
u
m
e
s
t
h
a
t
$
6
.
1
1
b
n
i
s
p
a
i
d
t
o
f
a
r
m
e
r
s
a
s
P
F
C
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
i
n
1
9
9
7
a
n
d
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
s
e
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
a
r
e
m
a
d
e
i
n
e
a
c
h
p
e
r
i
o
d
o
f
t
i
m
e
f
r
o
m
1
9
9
7
i
n
p
e
r
p
e
t
u
i
t
y
.
T
h
e
s
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
c
c
u
r
i
n
t
h
e
s
h
o
r
t
r
u
n
a
n
d
a
r
e
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
d
t
o
t
h
e
b
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
m
o
d
e
l
(
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
P
F
C
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
)
.
b
S
e
e
f
o
o
t
n
o
t
e
a
o
n
p
a
g
e
3
2
.
33T
a
b
l
e
3
:
L
a
b
o
r
M
a
r
k
e
t
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
D
e
c
o
u
p
l
e
d
P
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
P
a
p
e
r
s
M
e
t
h
o
d
o
l
o
g
y
E
l
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
A
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
E
m
p
i
r
i
c
a
l
/
N
u
m
e
r
i
c
a
l
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
n
o
t
e
d
A
h
e
a
r
n
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
6
)
L
a
b
o
r
-
L
e
i
s
u
r
e
m
o
d
e
l
E
c
o
n
o
m
e
t
r
i
c
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
u
s
i
n
g
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
O
p
e
r
a
t
o
r
-
0
.
0
1
6
(
P
F
C
)
M
L
f
o
r
o
f
f
-
f
a
r
m
l
a
b
o
r
o
f
f
-
f
a
r
m
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
:
S
p
o
u
s
e
-
0
.
0
0
3
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
m
o
d
e
l
a
n
d
f
a
r
m
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
d
a
t
a
D
e
w
b
r
e
a
n
d
M
i
s
h
r
a
(
2
0
0
2
)
F
a
r
m
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
E
c
o
n
o
m
e
t
r
i
c
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
u
s
i
n
g
L
e
i
s
u
r
e
h
o
u
r
s
O
f
f
a
:
O
p
e
r
a
t
o
r
0
.
0
0
1
9
(
P
F
C
)
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
m
o
d
e
l
o
r
d
i
n
a
r
y
L
S
f
o
r
l
e
i
s
u
r
e
d
e
m
a
n
d
a
n
d
o
n
-
f
a
r
m
S
p
o
u
s
e
0
.
0
0
1
1
l
a
b
o
r
s
u
p
p
l
y
m
o
d
e
l
s
a
n
d
f
a
r
m
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
d
a
t
a
L
e
i
s
u
r
e
h
o
u
r
s
b
:
O
p
e
r
a
t
o
r
0
.
0
0
0
7
S
p
o
u
s
e
0
.
0
0
0
9
O
n
-
f
a
r
m
l
a
b
o
r
h
o
u
r
s
c
O
p
e
r
a
t
o
r
-
0
.
0
0
1
3
S
p
o
u
s
e
-
0
.
0
1
0
9
E
l
-
O
s
t
a
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
4
)
L
a
b
o
r
-
L
e
i
s
u
r
e
m
o
d
e
l
E
c
o
n
o
m
e
t
r
i
c
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
u
s
i
n
g
O
n
-
f
a
r
m
l
a
b
o
r
h
o
u
r
s
0
.
0
1
7
2
(
P
F
C
)
w
e
i
g
h
t
e
d
L
S
f
o
r
o
n
-
f
a
r
m
a
n
d
t
o
t
a
l
l
a
b
o
r
s
u
p
p
l
y
T
o
t
a
l
l
a
b
o
r
h
o
u
r
s
0
.
0
1
2
2
m
o
d
e
l
s
,
w
e
i
g
h
t
e
d
M
L
f
o
r
o
f
f
-
f
a
r
m
l
a
b
o
r
s
u
p
p
l
y
O
f
f
-
f
a
r
m
l
a
b
o
r
h
o
u
r
s
-
0
.
0
5
d
m
o
d
e
l
a
n
d
f
a
r
m
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
d
a
t
a
K
e
y
a
n
d
R
o
b
e
r
t
s
(
2
0
0
9
)
L
a
b
o
r
-
l
e
i
s
u
r
e
m
o
d
e
l
w
i
t
h
C
o
m
p
a
r
a
t
i
v
e
S
t
a
t
i
c
s
"
D
P
)
"
O
n
-
f
a
r
m
l
a
b
o
r
s
u
p
p
l
y
(
D
P
)
n
o
n
p
e
c
u
n
i
a
r
y
b
e
n
e
ﬁ
t
s
f
r
o
m
#
O
f
f
-
f
a
r
m
l
a
b
o
r
s
u
p
p
l
y
f
a
r
m
i
n
g
a
T
h
e
e
l
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
w
a
s
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
f
o
r
f
a
r
m
e
r
s
w
h
o
h
a
d
s
o
m
e
o
f
f
-
f
a
r
m
w
o
r
k
.
b
T
h
e
e
l
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
w
a
s
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
f
o
r
f
a
r
m
e
r
s
w
h
o
h
a
d
n
o
o
f
f
-
f
a
r
m
w
o
r
k
.
c
T
h
e
o
n
-
f
a
r
m
w
o
r
k
h
o
u
r
s
m
o
d
e
l
w
a
s
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
f
o
r
f
a
r
m
e
r
s
w
h
o
h
a
d
s
o
m
e
o
f
f
-
f
a
r
m
w
o
r
k
.
d
T
h
e
e
l
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
h
a
s
b
e
e
n
t
a
k
e
n
f
r
o
m
A
b
l
e
r
a
n
d
B
l
a
n
d
f
o
r
d
(
2
0
0
5
)
.
34T
a
b
l
e
4
:
L
a
n
d
M
a
r
k
e
t
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
D
e
c
o
u
p
l
e
d
P
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
P
a
p
e
r
s
M
e
t
h
o
d
o
l
o
g
y
E
l
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
A
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
E
m
p
i
r
i
c
a
l
/
N
u
m
e
r
i
c
a
l
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
n
o
t
e
d
G
o
h
i
n
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
0
)
T
w
o
s
e
c
t
o
r
p
a
r
t
i
a
l
-
"
D
P
)
"
i
n
L
a
n
d
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
)
"
i
n
O
u
t
p
u
t
(
D
i
r
e
c
t
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
l
a
n
d
)
e
q
u
i
l
i
b
r
i
u
m
m
o
d
e
l
s
u
p
p
l
y
D
e
w
b
r
e
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
1
)
P
E
M
C
r
o
p
M
o
d
e
l
a
P
o
l
i
c
y
s
i
m
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
E
U
0
.
0
6
(
A
r
e
a
P
a
y
m
e
n
t
b
)
e
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
s
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
I
m
p
a
c
t
U
.
S
.
0
.
0
9
1
9
9
8
d
a
t
a
R
a
t
i
o
c
:
M
e
x
i
c
o
0
.
1
5
T
r
a
d
e
E
U
0
.
0
4
I
m
p
a
c
t
U
.
S
.
0
.
0
7
R
a
t
i
o
:
M
e
x
i
c
o
0
.
1
4
G
o
o
d
w
i
n
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
3
a
)
N
e
t
P
r
e
s
e
n
t
V
a
l
u
e
E
c
o
n
o
m
e
t
r
i
c
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
u
s
i
n
g
L
a
n
d
v
a
l
u
e
s
:
"
$
1
i
n
D
P
)
"
b
y
$
4
.
0
6
(
P
F
C
)
m
o
d
e
l
w
h
i
c
h
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
w
e
i
g
h
t
e
d
p
e
r
-
a
c
r
e
p
e
r
-
a
c
r
e
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
b
o
o
t
s
t
r
a
p
p
i
n
g
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
a
n
d
f
a
r
m
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
(
f
a
r
m
)
G
o
o
d
w
i
n
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
3
b
)
d
”
”
L
a
n
d
v
a
l
u
e
s
:
"
$
1
i
n
D
P
)
"
b
y
$
4
.
9
4
(
P
F
C
)
p
e
r
-
a
c
r
e
p
e
r
-
a
c
r
e
R
o
b
e
r
t
s
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
3
)
M
o
d
e
l
o
f
l
a
n
d
r
e
n
t
s
E
c
o
n
o
m
e
t
r
i
c
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
L
a
n
d
r
e
n
t
s
:
"
$
1
i
n
G
e
)
"
b
y
$
0
.
3
3
-
1
.
5
5
(
P
F
C
,
L
D
P
a
n
d
o
t
h
e
r
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
)
e
q
u
a
l
t
o
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
u
s
i
n
g
o
r
d
i
n
a
r
y
L
S
a
n
d
p
e
r
-
a
c
r
e
p
e
r
-
a
c
r
e
l
e
s
s
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
t
o
f
a
c
t
o
r
s
f
a
r
m
-
l
e
v
e
l
d
a
t
a
o
t
h
e
r
t
h
a
n
l
a
n
d
a
n
d
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
R
o
e
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
3
)
I
n
t
e
r
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
l
t
h
r
e
e
-
s
e
c
t
o
r
M
o
d
e
l
i
s
c
a
l
i
b
r
a
t
e
d
L
a
n
d
V
a
l
u
e
s
:
"
i
n
D
P
"
b
y
8
.
3
%
(
P
F
C
)
C
G
E
m
o
d
e
l
t
o
1
9
9
7
U
.
S
.
d
a
t
a
b
y
$
6
.
1
1
b
n
f
)
i
n
t
h
e
l
o
n
g
r
u
n
"
b
y
9
%
i
n
t
h
e
s
h
o
r
t
r
u
n
F
r
a
n
d
s
e
n
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
3
)
M
u
l
t
i
-
r
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
,
s
t
a
t
i
c
C
G
E
C
a
l
i
b
r
a
t
e
d
t
o
G
T
A
P
g
L
a
n
d
P
r
i
c
e
"
b
y
7
5
%
(
S
i
n
g
l
e
u
n
i
f
o
r
m
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
l
a
n
d
)
m
o
d
e
l
u
n
d
e
r
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
y
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
w
i
t
h
a
d
j
u
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
m
a
d
e
t
o
c
a
p
t
u
r
e
t
h
e
f
e
a
t
u
r
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
A
g
e
n
d
a
2
0
0
0
r
e
f
o
r
m
s
G
o
o
d
w
i
n
a
n
d
M
i
s
h
r
a
(
2
0
0
6
)
E
U
m
a
x
i
m
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
E
c
o
n
o
m
e
t
r
i
c
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
u
s
i
n
g
L
a
n
d
I
d
l
i
n
g
h
-
0
.
3
3
0
(
P
F
C
)
t
h
e
t
w
o
-
s
t
e
p
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
a
n
d
f
a
r
m
-
l
e
v
e
l
d
a
t
a
G
o
h
i
n
(
2
0
0
6
)
M
u
l
t
i
-
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
t
a
t
i
c
C
G
E
m
o
d
e
l
C
a
l
i
b
r
a
t
e
d
t
o
1
9
9
5
E
u
r
o
s
t
a
t
d
a
t
a
L
a
n
d
r
e
n
t
#
D
P
b
y
9
0
%
)
#
b
y

=
8
0
%
(
A
g
e
n
d
a
2
0
0
0
a
r
a
b
l
e
c
r
o
p
d
i
r
e
c
t
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
)
a
n
d
F
E
O
G
A
/
W
T
O
n
o
t
i
ﬁ
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
T
h
e
P
E
M
m
o
d
e
l
s
t
a
n
d
s
f
o
r
P
o
l
i
c
y
E
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
M
a
t
r
i
x
m
o
d
e
l
a
n
d
w
a
s
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
O
E
C
D
.
b
T
h
e
a
r
e
a
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
s
t
h
a
t
l
a
n
d
b
e
i
n
a
r
a
b
l
e
u
s
e
.
T
h
e
p
a
p
e
r
a
l
s
o
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
s
a
r
e
a
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
w
h
i
c
h
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
a
n
d
a
t
o
r
y
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
.
T
h
e
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
h
e
r
e
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
a
l
o
w
e
r
b
o
u
n
d
.
c
T
h
e
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
t
r
a
d
e
i
m
p
a
c
t
r
a
t
i
o
s
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
t
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
t
r
a
d
e
o
f
a
g
i
v
e
n
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
d
b
y
a
r
e
a
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
t
h
e
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
i
m
p
a
c
t
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
t
r
a
d
e
o
f
t
h
e
s
a
m
e
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
m
a
r
k
e
t
p
r
i
c
e
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
.
d
G
o
o
d
w
i
n
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
3
a
)
u
s
e
s
d
a
t
a
f
o
r
t
h
e
y
e
a
r
s
1
9
9
8
-
2
0
0
0
,
w
h
i
l
e
G
o
o
d
w
i
n
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
3
b
)
u
s
e
s
d
a
t
a
f
o
r
t
h
e
y
e
a
r
s
1
9
9
8
-
2
0
0
1
.
T
h
e
e
x
p
l
a
n
a
t
o
r
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
u
s
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
t
w
o
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
a
l
s
o
d
i
f
f
e
r
.
e
G
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
a
m
o
n
g
o
t
h
e
r
s
,
P
F
C
a
n
d
L
D
P
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
.
f
T
h
e
p
a
p
e
r
a
s
s
u
m
e
s
t
h
a
t
$
6
.
1
1
b
n
i
s
p
a
i
d
t
o
f
a
r
m
e
r
s
a
s
P
F
C
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
i
n
1
9
9
7
a
n
d
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
s
e
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
a
r
e
m
a
d
e
i
n
e
a
c
h
p
e
r
i
o
d
o
f
t
i
m
e
f
r
o
m
1
9
9
7
i
n
p
e
r
p
e
t
u
i
t
y
.
g
G
T
A
P
s
t
a
n
d
s
f
o
r
G
l
o
b
a
l
T
r
a
d
e
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
P
r
o
j
e
c
t
.
h
L
a
n
d
i
d
l
i
n
g
r
e
f
e
r
s
t
o
t
h
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
a
c
r
e
s
n
o
t
h
a
r
v
e
s
t
e
d
.
A
n
a
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
o
f
l
a
n
d
i
d
l
i
n
g
u
s
e
d
w
a
s
t
h
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
a
c
r
e
s
n
o
t
c
r
o
p
p
e
d
.
T
h
e
e
l
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
f
o
r
t
h
i
s
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
w
a
s
-
0
.
1
6
.
35T
a
b
l
e
5
:
E
x
p
e
c
t
a
t
i
o
n
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
D
e
c
o
u
p
l
e
d
P
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
P
a
p
e
r
s
M
e
t
h
o
d
o
l
o
g
y
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
a
n
d
m
a
g
n
i
t
u
d
e
w
h
e
n
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
A
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
E
m
p
i
r
i
c
a
l
/
N
u
m
e
r
i
c
a
l
S
u
m
n
e
r
(
2
0
0
3
)
P
r
e
s
e
n
t
v
a
l
u
e
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
P
a
r
a
m
e
t
r
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
i
v
e
D
e
g
r
e
e
o
f
l
i
n
k
a
g
e
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
f
u
t
u
r
e
D
P
(
D
P
)
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
a
n
d
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
=
0
.
2
7
a
L
a
g
e
r
k
v
i
s
t
(
2
0
0
5
)
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
m
o
d
e
l
N
u
m
e
r
i
c
a
l
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
o
f
t
h
e
E
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
#
i
n
D
P
)
F
a
r
m
e
r
s
b
e
c
o
m
e
m
o
r
e
(
A
r
e
a
P
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
)
u
n
d
e
r
t
i
m
i
n
g
a
n
d
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
m
o
d
e
l
u
s
i
n
g
a
s
u
r
v
e
y
i
n
c
l
i
n
e
d
t
o
o
v
e
r
-
i
n
v
e
s
t
u
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
y
o
f
S
w
e
d
i
s
h
f
a
r
m
e
r
s
M
c
I
n
t
o
s
h
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
6
)
R
a
n
d
o
m
-
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
m
o
d
e
l
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
u
s
i
n
g
d
a
t
a
S
h
i
f
t
i
n
b
a
s
e
a
c
r
e
s
t
o
w
a
r
d
s
(
C
C
P
)
u
n
d
e
r
p
r
i
c
e
a
n
d
o
b
t
a
i
n
e
d
f
r
o
m
a
n
e
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
c
r
o
p
o
f
7
.
9
2
%
b
p
o
l
i
c
y
u
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
y
a
n
d
D
A
R
A
p
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
C
o
b
l
e
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
8
)
C
e
n
s
o
r
e
d
p
r
o
b
i
t
m
o
d
e
l
S
u
r
v
e
y
d
a
t
a
f
r
o
m
I
o
w
a
W
i
l
l
i
n
g
n
e
s
s
t
o
a
c
c
e
p
t
a
o
n
e
t
i
m
e
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
i
n
l
i
e
u
(
D
P
c
a
n
d
C
C
P
)
a
n
d
M
i
s
s
i
s
s
i
p
p
i
f
a
r
m
e
r
s
o
f
a
n
o
p
p
o
r
t
u
n
i
t
y
t
o
u
p
d
a
t
e
=
$
4
8
.
1
6
p
e
r
a
c
r
e
B
h
a
s
k
a
r
a
n
d
B
e
g
h
i
n
(
2
0
0
8
)
A
c
r
e
a
g
e
a
n
d
N
i
t
r
o
g
e
n
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
N
u
m
e
r
i
c
a
l
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
u
s
i
n
g
M
a
x
i
m
u
m
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
i
n
a
c
r
e
a
g
e
o
f
6
.
2
5
%
(
D
P
c
,
C
C
P
)
c
h
o
i
c
e
u
n
d
e
r
p
r
i
c
e
,
y
i
e
l
d
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
e
s
t
a
t
e
a
n
d
M
a
x
i
m
u
m
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
i
n
y
i
e
l
d
o
f
0
.
1
3
4
%
a
n
d
p
o
l
i
c
y
u
n
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
y
c
h
o
i
c
e
s
e
t
s
a
T
h
e
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
t
h
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
o
f
l
i
n
k
a
g
e
i
s
s
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
e
t
o
t
h
e
a
s
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
s
m
a
d
e
w
h
i
l
e
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
n
g
i
t
.
S
e
e
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
7
o
f
t
h
e
t
e
x
t
f
o
r
d
e
t
a
i
l
s
.
b
E
a
c
h
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
i
s
e
n
d
o
w
e
d
w
i
t
h
“
t
o
k
e
n
s
”
,
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
i
n
g
b
a
s
e
a
c
r
e
s
.
T
h
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
h
a
s
t
o
i
n
v
e
s
t
t
h
e
t
o
k
e
n
s
i
n
e
i
t
h
e
r
a
“
B
l
u
e
”
o
p
t
i
o
n
o
r
a
“
R
e
d
”
o
p
t
i
o
n
o
r
a
c
o
m
b
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
t
w
o
.
B
l
u
e
t
o
k
e
n
s
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
a
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
c
r
o
p
,
w
h
i
l
e
a
r
e
d
t
o
k
e
n
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
a
n
o
n
-
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
c
r
o
p
o
r
a
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
c
r
o
p
w
h
i
c
h
t
h
e
f
a
r
m
e
r
h
a
s
n
o
t
p
l
a
n
t
e
d
e
a
r
l
i
e
r
.
c
D
P
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
t
h
e
d
i
r
e
c
t
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
m
a
d
e
u
n
d
e
r
t
h
e
2
0
0
2
F
S
R
I
A
c
t
.
36T
a
b
l
e
6
:
O
t
h
e
r
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
D
e
c
o
u
p
l
e
d
P
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
P
a
p
e
r
s
M
e
t
h
o
d
o
l
o
g
y
E
l
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
A
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
E
m
p
i
r
i
c
a
l
/
N
u
m
e
r
i
c
a
l
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
n
o
t
e
d
(
M
e
c
h
a
n
i
s
m
a
)
A
d
a
m
s
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
1
)
-
E
c
o
n
o
m
e
t
r
i
c
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
u
s
i
n
g
A
c
r
e
a
g
e
b
0
.
0
2
6
(
P
F
C
a
n
d
M
L
A
)
m
i
x
e
d
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
m
e
t
h
o
d
s
a
n
d
s
t
a
t
e
-
l
e
v
e
l
d
a
t
a
G
u
y
o
m
a
r
d
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
4
)
O
n
e
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
t
a
t
i
c
m
o
d
e
l
u
n
d
e
r
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
y
-
"
i
n
D
P
)
"
i
n
T
o
t
a
l
P
r
o
ﬁ
t
(
L
u
m
p
s
u
m
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
)
(
D
P
m
i
n
ﬂ
u
e
n
c
e
s
t
h
e
e
n
t
r
y
-
e
x
i
t
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
o
f
"
i
n
D
P
m
)
"
i
n
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
f
a
r
m
e
r
s
b
y
r
e
q
u
i
r
i
n
g
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
f
a
r
m
e
r
s
f
o
r
e
l
i
g
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
;
D
P
i
s
f
u
l
l
y
d
e
c
o
u
p
l
e
d
c
)
S
e
r
r
a
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
5
b
)
D
u
a
l
m
o
d
e
l
o
f
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
y
E
c
o
n
o
m
e
t
r
i
c
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
P
e
s
t
i
c
i
d
e
u
s
e
i
n
:
C
e
r
e
a
l
s
0
.
3
5
4
9
(
A
r
e
a
P
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
)
(
T
h
e
o
p
t
i
m
a
l
u
s
e
o
f
p
e
s
t
i
c
i
d
e
s
u
s
i
n
g
Z
e
l
l
n
e
r
’
s
S
U
R
d
O
i
l
s
e
e
d
s
a
n
d
d
e
p
e
n
d
s
o
n
l
a
n
d
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
w
h
i
c
h
a
n
d
f
a
r
m
-
l
e
v
e
l
d
a
t
a
P
r
o
t
e
i
n
C
r
o
p
s
0
.
3
9
1
9
i
s
a
f
f
e
c
t
e
d
b
y
a
r
e
a
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
)
C
h
a
u
a
n
d
d
e
G
o
r
t
e
r
(
2
0
0
5
)
O
n
e
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
t
a
t
i
c
m
o
d
e
l
M
o
d
e
l
c
a
l
i
b
r
a
t
e
d
t
o
O
u
t
p
u
t
0
.
0
3
4
(
P
F
C
)
u
n
d
e
r
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
t
y
1
9
9
8
U
.
S
.
w
h
e
a
t
s
e
c
t
o
r
E
x
p
o
r
t
s
0
.
1
0
6
(
D
P
i
n
ﬂ
u
e
n
c
e
s
e
n
t
r
y
-
e
x
i
t
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
b
y
e
n
a
b
l
i
n
g
f
a
r
m
e
r
s
t
o
c
o
v
e
r
ﬁ
x
e
d
c
o
s
t
s
)
B
e
c
k
m
a
n
a
n
d
W
a
i
l
e
s
(
2
0
0
5
)
N
e
r
l
o
v
e
m
o
d
e
l
o
f
s
u
p
p
l
y
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
E
c
o
n
o
m
e
t
r
i
c
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
u
s
i
n
g
A
c
r
e
a
g
e
e
R
i
c
e
:
0
.
1
9
7
f
(
C
C
P
)
o
r
d
i
n
a
r
y
L
S
a
n
d
s
t
a
t
e
-
l
e
v
e
l
d
a
t
a
G
o
o
d
w
i
n
a
n
d
M
i
s
h
r
a
(
2
0
0
6
)
g
E
U
m
a
x
i
m
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
E
c
o
n
o
m
e
t
r
i
c
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
u
s
i
n
g
A
c
r
e
a
g
e
:
C
o
r
n
0
.
0
3
1
7
(
P
F
C
)
t
h
e
t
w
o
-
s
t
e
p
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
S
o
y
b
e
a
n
s
0
.
0
2
0
4
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
a
n
d
f
a
r
m
-
l
e
v
e
l
d
a
t
a
W
h
e
a
t
0
.
0
4
2
8
a
T
h
e
m
e
c
h
a
n
i
s
m
b
y
w
h
i
c
h
t
h
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
u
l
a
r
D
P
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
t
h
e
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
i
s
i
d
e
n
t
i
ﬁ
e
d
.
I
n
t
h
e
c
a
s
e
o
f
A
d
a
m
s
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
1
)
,
B
e
c
k
m
a
n
a
n
d
W
a
i
l
e
s
(
2
0
0
5
)
a
n
d
G
o
o
d
w
i
n
a
n
d
M
i
s
h
r
a
(
2
0
0
6
)
t
h
e
e
x
a
c
t
m
e
c
h
a
n
i
s
m
i
s
n
o
t
i
d
e
n
t
i
ﬁ
e
d
,
o
n
l
y
t
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
D
P
a
r
e
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
.
b
A
c
r
e
a
g
e
i
s
t
h
e
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
a
c
r
e
a
g
e
o
f
7
c
r
o
p
s
a
c
r
o
s
s
1
1
s
t
a
t
e
s
.
c
D
P
i
s
d
e
c
o
u
p
l
e
d
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
m
a
n
d
a
t
o
r
y
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
D
P
m
i
s
d
e
c
o
u
p
l
e
d
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
w
i
t
h
m
a
n
d
a
t
o
r
y
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
.
d
S
U
R
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
S
e
e
m
i
n
g
l
y
U
n
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
.
e
A
c
r
e
a
g
e
h
a
r
v
e
s
t
e
d
i
n
A
r
k
a
n
s
a
s
,
C
a
l
i
f
o
r
n
i
a
,
L
o
u
i
s
i
a
n
a
,
M
i
s
s
i
s
s
i
p
p
i
,
T
e
x
a
s
a
n
d
M
i
s
s
o
u
r
i
f
o
r
l
o
n
g
a
n
d
m
e
d
i
u
m
g
r
a
i
n
r
i
c
e
.
f
S
h
o
r
t
-
r
u
n
e
l
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
g
T
h
e
e
l
a
s
t
i
c
i
t
y
d
e
r
i
v
e
d
h
e
r
e
d
o
e
s
n
o
t
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
t
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
f
P
F
C
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
o
n
t
h
e
r
i
s
k
-
a
v
e
r
s
e
n
a
t
u
r
e
o
f
f
a
r
m
e
r
s
o
r
o
n
c
r
e
d
i
t
c
o
n
s
t
r
a
i
n
t
s
f
a
c
e
d
b
y
f
a
r
m
e
r
s
.
I
n
t
h
e
p
a
p
e
r
t
h
e
s
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
a
r
e
d
e
ﬁ
n
e
d
t
o
b
e
t
h
e
“
d
i
r
e
c
t
”
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
t
h
e
P
F
C
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
.
37